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Abstract
The topic of my thesis is the insanity defense. The insanity defense is a tactic that
is rarely used and rarely successful. Generally states fall into three categories: Those who
use the M'Naghten rule of law, those who use the American Law Institute (ALI) Model
Penal Code, and those who have abolished the use of the insanity defense. This research
compares states from each category to investigate whether or not the type of rule used
affects the outcome. In order to determine whether these categories matter, the paper
compares similar appellate felony case outcomes in New Jersey and North Carolina,
Michigan and Oregon, and Utah and Nevada. The states were chosen based on how
representative they were of all of the states in their respective categories. The expectation
was that different insanity defense laws will have a marginal impact on the outcome. The
expectation was found to be true, even with the limited availability of cases, after
analyzing each state’s statue and the cases, the conclusion was that the rule of law used to
evaluate the insanity of defendants or lack of a law has little or no affect on the outcome
each insanity defense cases.

Introduction
The insanity defense is a topic that seems to garner a lot of attention even though
it is rarely used and only a few cases that invoke are actually successful. So why is this
topic so popular considering its rarity? The answer could be a combination of highly
publicized cases that use it and the public’s misunderstanding of exactly what happens
when someone is found “not guilty by reason of insanity”. It is because of cases like John
Hinckley and Andrea Yates where the defendants are found NGRI coupled with the
public’s misunderstanding that causes the public to become so outraged with the insanity
defense. The public has this common misconception that someone found NGRI is just let
go and is not punished for his or her crimes, but in reality a person found NGRI is almost
always civilly committed and often for a longer time then if the defendant had gone to
prison. Public outcry can have a big affect on a state’s insanity defense laws ranging from
changing the rule of law used to abolishing the defense altogether.
The focus of this research is to see if the difference in rule of law used or lack of a
rule can change the outcome in a case where the insanity defense was used. This
information is useful because perhaps if there is a difference then maybe the states should
all move to using one rule of law or maybe as some have proposed the defense should be
abolished altogether. Very little research has been done on this topic even though the
public seems to have quite the opinion on the topic and their opinion can be very
influential. The findings are limited as there were only a few cases analyzed. The limited
cases came from the lack of information available, because most inanity cases are at the
district court level and district courts do not traditionally publish their cases. It is because
of the lack of published district cases that appellate court cases were used, but even then

it was difficult to find cases that had to deal directly with the insanity defense and the rule
of law used.
The findings, while limited, seemed to show that the rule of law used does not
have an impact on the outcome of the case. There is some evidence in the states that
abolished the insanity defense that if the case was tried in state that allows the defense the
outcome might have been different, but there is no guarantee that would have happened
considering how few cases are successful in the using the defense. One model used by
Oregon did seem to be promising in potentially addressing some the issues that the public
has with the insanity defense, but further research is needed to make definitive
conclusions and hopefully that research will take place considering the growing public
interest in the insanity defense.
History
The insanity defense has a long history, dating all the way back to Hebrew law,
which was further developed by Plato and Aristotle (Stimpson 1994). The beginning tests
were mostly focused on mens rea or “guilty mind” as the main component to evaluate
whether or not someone meets the requirements of criminal responsibility. In order for
someone to be found guilty of a crime they must have actus reus or “guilty act” and mens
rea. When dealing with the insanity defense, the guilty act is not usually in question, but
it is whether or not the defendant knew wrongfulness of his crime. The first formal
insanity defense that was used by a court of law was the wild beast test named by English
judge, Judge Tracy 1724. The wild beast standard states “ for someone to be insane he
must be totally deprived of his understanding and memory, and not know what he is

doing anymore than an infant, a brute, or a wild beast” (Huss 2009). The wild beast
standard was the rule of law in England for about 100 years, until the M’Naghten case.
The M’Naghten rule came from a case where Englishman Daniel M’Naghten
killed the secretary of the prime minister because he thought Robert Peel, the prime
minister was leading a conspiracy against him. After he couldn’t escape this supposed
conspiracy against him he decided to kill Peel, but instead killed his secretary.
(Wrightsman & al. 2002). M’Naghten was found to be insane by nine expert witnesses
because he could not tell right from wrong (Huss 2009). The M’Naghten rule has three
prongs, first that there must be a mental illness present, second is the inability to know
the nature and the quality of the act, and the last prong is the knowing right from wrong
(Huss 2009). It is often pointed out that M’Naghten is too narrow, so several states have
included an irresistible impulse test that suggests even if a person knows the nature and
quality of the act and that such an action is wrong, he still may not be able to stop himself
(Huss 2009).
In 1962 the American Law Institute (ALI), came up with a slightly different
standard in its Model Penal Code. The Model Penal Code states:
A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a
result of mental disease or defect he lacks the substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality (wrongfulness) of his conduct or to conform his
conduct to the requirements of the law (Section 4.01) (Huss 2009)
In 1984 Congress passed Insanity Defense Reform Act, which removed the volitional
prong of ALI from federal cases and focused on the cognitive and affective components.

Hinckley Trial:
The Hinckley Trial is important because it was one of the catalysts for so many
states changing their insanity defense laws. John Hinckley tried to assonate the President
Ronald Regan in order to impress actress Jodie Foster, who he was in love with. On
March 30, 1981 he shot the president and wounded and killed others around him. It was
not surprising that he would try to use the insanity defense. “All of the government
psychiatrists concluded that Hinckley was legally sane—that he appreciated the
wrongfulness of his act—at the time of the shooting” (Linder 2008). The three defense
psychiatrists said Hinckley was legally insane and further evidence to support his lack of
mental stability came when he tried to kill himself twice, once with an overdose of
Valium and the other hanging (Linder 2008). Two of the psychiatrists said that he
suffered from psychosis and that he thought he was acting out the script from the movie
Taxi Driver; in fact, a complete showing of the movie closed the defense case (Linder
2008). John W. Hinckley was found “not guilty by reason of insanity on all thirteen
counts. After the case Congress shifted the burden of proof of insanity to the defense.
“Joining Congress in shifting the burden of proof were a number of states” (Linder
2008). Within three years after the Hinckley verdict, two-thirds of the states placed the
burden on the defense to prove insanity, while eight states adopted a separate verdict of
"guilty but mentally ill," and one state (Utah) abolished the defense altogether” (Linder
2008).
Throughout the history of civilization there has been some form of an insanity
defense, even though the first formal use and naming of it did not occur until 1724. Even
though the different rules of law followed for evaluating have not changed since ALI,

various case such as the Hinckley case have caused states from time to time to reevaluate
what rule of law they use.
Method
The data collection relied on qualitative research methods in collecting and
analyzing data. The methods consisted of library research using various textbooks, the
Westlaw database, and various states legislative websites. The textbooks were used to
gain information on the history of the insanity defense tests and the parts of each of those
tests. Westlaw was used to gain access to the cases needed and to look at various essays
and articles in law reviews and journals to gain more in-depth knowledge on some of the
states. The state legislative websites allowed for each states statute regarding the insanity
defense to be accessed and analyzed along with the cases from each state. Appellate court
cases were used because of a lack of availability of the original court cases decisions as
most district courts or original jurisdiction courts do not often publish their decisions.
Each state was chosen for various reasons some of the reasons are the same.
California and Texas, two of the M’Naghten states were chosen for being states that
heavily influences legislative decisions that affect the entire country. New Jersey was
chosen because it was a good representation of states that use the M’Naghten rule of law,
but unlike California and Texas is not generally considered one that has great influence
over legal and political trends in the U.S.
New York was chosen for the same reason as Texas and California. Michigan was
chosen as a state to be researched because it not only was representative of states using
the ALI rule, but because it is a state like New Jersey, which does not set precedent for
other states and does not greatly influence political and legal trends. Oregon was chose as

the last state for ALI because it is unique in how it defines the criminally insane and the
procedures of how to handle someone found legally insane.
Idaho was chosen because in 1982, after the public outrage of the Hinckley trial,
Idaho decided to not only reform its laws regarding the insanity defense, but to abolish it.
Montana was chosen because the insanity defense was abolished as an affirmative
defense, but Model Penal Code test for insanity was moved to the sentencing statutes and
placed consideration of a defendant's mental defect in the post-conviction phase of the
criminal proceedings. The last state chosen was Kansas because it abolished the insanity
defense after Idaho, Montana, and Utah did between 1979 and 1983 and it changed in
1995 because there was a national mood of skepticism towards the insanity defense and it
was a way for the legislature to soothe public concerns and gain popularity, but it wasn’t
done as a direct result of the Hinckley trial.
M’Naghten
California:
California has used the M’Naghten rule of law since the Nineteenth century, with
some variations to the law over time. In 1978, Justice Tobriner gave the opinion of as to
why the state of California should switch from the M’Naghten test to the American Law
Institute test. His opinion was as follows:
For over a century California has followed the M'Naghten test to define the
defenses of insanity and idiocy. The deficiencies of that test have long been
apparent, and judicial attempts to reinterpret or evade the limitations of
M'Naghten have proven inadequate…we have concluded that we should discard
the M'Naghten language, and update the California test of mental incapacity as a

criminal defense by adopting the test proposed by the American Law Institute and
followed by the federal judiciary and the courts of 15 states. (People v. Drew).
The test was short lived for in 1982 the people of California including voters and
legislators passed Proposition 8, which added section 25 to the California Penal Code and
restored M’Naghten as the test for insanity (Lashbrook 2003). The current statute has two
prongs the act prong and the wrongfulness prong. California has also tried to tackle the
question of voluntary intoxication. While someone who is suffering from a mental
disease or defect such as schizophrenia would have no trouble enter a plea of insanity the
question is whether or not some who voluntarily uses drugs or alcohol enter a plea of
temporary insanity. The case People v. Robinson brought forth a change in insanity
defense instructions for the jury to read:
A person is legally insane if, by reason of mental disease or mental defect, either
temporary or permanent, caused in part by the long continued use of [alcohol]
[drugs] [narcotics], even after the effects of recent use of [alcohol] [drugs]
[narcotics] have worn off, [he][she] was incapable at the time of the commission
of the crime of either:
1. Knowing the nature and quality of [his] [her] act; or
2. Understanding the nature and quality of [his] [her] act; or
3. Distinguishing right from wrong
However, this defense does not apply when the sole or only basis or causative
factor for the mental disease or mental defect is an addiction to, or an abuse of,
intoxicating substances. (Lashbrook 2003).

There is also the aspect of knowing right from wrong. What is legally wrong may
not always be what someone thinks is morally wrong. A common theme that shows how
legal wrongs can be different from moral wrongs is when someone kills in the name of
God. The person may know that killing is illegal, but the person feels they need to
commit the act because it goes against the morals of his or her God. The morality of the
defendant must reflect “generally accepted ethical or moral principals derived from an
external force” (Lashbrook 2003). But the defendant cannot use just any set of morals to
be found legally insane. His or her morals must coincide with the morals generally
accepted by society. The morals generally accepted by society are influenced by the
Judeo-Christian God, so to be found legally insane a defendant must have committed
their acts under the influence of the Christian God and not another god (Lashbrook 2003).
An example of this is in People v. Coddington, where the defendant was convicted of
“first degree murders with multiple murder special circumstance, as to murders of
chaperones of two young girls, and forcible rape, oral copulation, and forcible digital
penetration of the girls” (People v. Coddington). There was evidence that Coddington had
“rejected the Judeo-Christian concept of God and the moral system associated therewith”
(Lashbrook 2003). He was found to be legally sane because his idea of what is moral
does not match with definition of morality to be found insane under the definition of legal
insanity. A defendant’s idea of what is morally right must match the jury’s idea of what is
morally right to be found legally insane.
A case that helps to show California’s rule of law is People v. Severance, in
which the defendant was convicted of four counts of second-degree robbery, with four
related weapon enhancements. The case was reversed and remanded for a trial on the

defendant’s insanity plea. The defendant appealed his verdict of sanity, but the court of
appeal held that:
Defendant failed to offer sufficient evidence to establish reasonable conclusion
that, based on mental disease or defect, he was incapable of distinguishing right from
wrong when he committed three robberies, as required to support his insanity defense;
defendant simply denied having committed first robbery and, as to second two robberies,
testified that he became paranoid and schizophrenic and was taken control of by Satan
and abducted by aliens as the result of being hit on the head, which failed to support a
claim that he was acting under an insane delusion that robbing two stores was morally
correct, as required to support legal insanity defense (People v. Severance).
This case shows the moral wrong part of the wrongfulness prong of the
M’Naghten test being put into action and how a defendant’s moral reasoning must match
that of the jury or society to be found legally insane. The way moral wrong is interpreted
in California and I would suggest in other states as well gives rise to the issue of
separation of church and state and freedom to practice any religion. While there has to be
a line so that defendants can’t just make up a religion and its practices so they can say
that their god or devil told them to do something, a defendant should not be made to
conform to Judeo-Christian beliefs to plead insanity on moral grounds. The constitutional
issues are a topic for another day, but it is something that should be at least mentioned
when analyzing whether or not different state practices concerning the insanity defense
affects the outcome of cases.
New Jersey:
The New Jersey statute states:

A person is not criminally responsible for conduct if at the time of such conduct
he was laboring under such a defect of reason from disease of the mind, as not to
know the nature and quality of the act he was doing, or if he did know it, then he
did not know what he was doing was wrong. (N.J. Stat. Unann. § 2C:4-1).
The case State v. Conforti shows when the standards are applied to test whether or
not someone is legally insane and that person is not legally insane, it can still benefit the
defendant to be charged with a lesser offense. As stated in the New Jersey statute
“evidence of mental disease or defect is admissible whenever relevant to prove that the
defendant did not have a state of which is an element of the offense” (N.J. Stat. Unann. §
2C:4-2). In Conforti, the defendant was charged with first-degree murder. The jury found
the defendant guilty of second-degree murder, but Conforti said it was a compromise
verdict because the jury thought he was insane so they made the charge a lesser degree.
The Supreme Court of New Jersey held that:
Testimony of the defendant’s psychiatric experts was adequate to support a
finding that, although defendant was not insane under M’Naghten Rule at the time
of commission of the homicide, he lacked mental capacity to deliberate or
premeditate and could be guilty of murder in the second degree rather than
murder in the first degree. (State v. Conforti).
It is not uncommon for states to use evidence of mental defect to negate an
offense element and this case speaks to that point. It is how most states that have
abolished the insanity defense as an affirmative defense handles the issue of a defendant
having a mental disease or defect. So this goes to the ultimate question of if states who
have rules for determining criminal insanity, but still allow mental disease or defect to

negate offense elements and some states allow insanity to affect sentencing after the trial,
then is there a real difference between these states and how they affect the outcomes of
insanity cases? This question will be addressed in the conclusion of this essay.
Texas:
Texas’ insanity defense history is similar is some regards to that of California.
Texas uses a slight variation on the original M’Naghten test. The Texas insanity defense
is stated in section 8.01 of the Texas Penal Code. Section 8.01 states the following:
Insanity. (a) It is an affirmative defense to prosecution that, at the time of the
conduct charged, the actor, as a result of severe mental disease or defect, did not
know that his conduct was wrong.
(b) The term “mental disease or defect” does not include an abnormality
manifested only by repeated criminal or otherwise antisocial conduct.
As was the case in California, Texas briefly changed to the ALI's Model Penal
Code in 1973. The ALI test did not last long because “After the public outrage relating to
the result of the Hinckley trial, the Texas Legislature in 1983 rushed to narrow the scope
of the insanity defense to its present restrictive M’Naghten formulation” (Shannon 2006).
In 2005 the state legislature sought to revamp the procedures that go along with
the insanity defense through Senate Bill 837. The Texas Senate Jurisprudence Committee
evaluated changing the defense to guilty but mentally ill, but rejected changing it because
“the individual found guilty but mentally ill may not receive the caliber of mental health
care expected as few get the same level of treatment they would outside of prison”
(Shannon 2006). S.B. 837 provides “substantial direction to the court in overseeing the
follow up treatment and supervision of an individual found NGRI” (Shannon 2006).

There has been a move to add a narrow volitional prong to Sec. 8.01 and to
change the wording from “know” to “appreciate”. Several groups including the National
Alliance on Metal Illness supports a two-prong test, which would have the cognitive
component and the coalitional component. The reason for the move is because “a
defendant rarely prevails on an insanity defense in Texas” because “If a defendant knows
that their conduct is prohibited by law, or wrong in a legal sense, then they are sane for
the purposes of the Texas insanity defense” even if the person is seriously mentally ill or
unable to control his or her behavior (Shannon 2006). The move to “appreciate” over
“know” is because as with the volitional prong, someone may be able to know something
is wrong but they may not be able to stop the action or appreciate the wrongfulness of the
action even though they “know” that is it wrong. There has also been a move to adopt the
Oregon approach, which has several interesting aspects, for example, it uses the word
guilty instead of not guilty because it appeals more to the jury. A more in depth look at
the various aspects of the Oregon approach will be explored later in this essay.
The case that was examined is one of the biggest cases dealing with the insanity
defense. The case is that dealing with Andrea Yates. Yates was a mother of five children,
who also had a history of mental illness and psychiatric hospitalization consisting of
twice attempting suicide, being hospitalized four times for psychiatric care and nursing a
psychosis before the drownings (Roche 2002). In March of 2000 she drowned her five
children one by one in the bathtub. She was found guilty of first degree murder and was
sentenced to life in prison. Yates was a awarded a new trial on the basis of an appeal
because an expert witness for the prosecution had made an inaccurate statement while
testifying. The expert witness, Dr. Park Dietz a nationally known psychiatrist, wrote a

letter to the court stating his error, but when the defense tried to get a mistrial, the judge
refused to declare a mistrial. But when reviewed by the appellate court it was decided the
trial judge erred and so a new trial ordered (Huss 2009). It was in the second trial that
Andrea Yates was found NGRI and is now in a mental institution where she is likely to
spend the rest of her life. The question that comes to mind regarding Texas is with so
many groups and experts moving for changes in Texas’ statues on insanity why haven’t
any changes been made? Perhaps Texas is an example of how no matter what rule of law
is chosen to evaluate legal insanity there will always be groups and experts who have
ways to improve it. Also Texas has changed from M’Naghten to ALI back to M’Naghten
with some revisions and it seems that no matter what the state tries to do to help improve
insanity statues there are critics of the changes.
The three M’Naghten states all have statues that bring up very interesting
questions. While New York’s interpretation on moral wrongfulness brings up
constitutional questions, it is the questions raised by Texas and New Jersey that cause the
most intrigue because they help to answer the research question and to support the
conclusion that if states that allow the insanity defense allow for mental disease or defect
to affect offense elements and states with the insanity defense allow for it to be raised
during the sentencing phase then is there any real difference between how those states
treat the insanity defense?

American Law Institute Model Penal Code
New York:
According to section 40.15 of the New York penal law:

Mental disease or defect.
In any prosecution for an offense, it is an affirmative defense that when the
defendant engaged in the proscribed conduct, he lacked criminal responsibility by
reason of mental disease or defect. Such lack of criminal responsibility means
that at the time of such conduct, as a result of mental disease or defect, he lacked
substantial capacity to know or appreciate either:
1. The nature and consequences of such conduct; or
2. That such conduct was wrong. (McKinney's Penal Law § 40.15) New York
also has the defense of extreme emotional disturbance which does not require
psychological or psychiatric evidence to prove such defense. To establish the affirmative
defense of extreme emotional disturbance, a defendant must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that:
(a) He acted under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance, and (b) there
was a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional disturbance, the
reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a person in the
defendant's situation under the circumstances as the defendant believed them to
be. (McKinney's Penal Law § 125.25, subd. 1(a)).
In the course of researching insanity cases in New York several of the cases that
were briefly analyzed dealt with extreme emotional disturbance (EED) and not directly
with the insanity defense and the application of the ALI Model Penal Code. In People v.
Ross, the defendant tried to use the defense of EED, but did not meet the requirements,
which are as follows:
The affirmative defense of extreme emotional distress requires proof of both

subjective and objective elements; the subjective element focuses on the
defendant's state of mind at the time of the crime and requires sufficient evidence
that the defendant's conduct was actually influenced by an extreme emotional
disturbance, generally associated with a loss of self-control, and, the objective
element requires proof of a reasonable explanation or excuse for the emotional
disturbance to be determined by viewing the subjective mental condition of the
defendant and the external circumstances as the defendant perceived them to be at
the time. (People v. Leslie)
The defendant, Ross, submitted limited evidence to support his claim of EED for a lesser
charge than that of second-degree murder. The evidence submitted consisted of “a ‘love’
letter he wrote a month before incident, history of troubled relationship between him and
victim, and victim's involvement with new boyfriend, reflected only basis for presence of
anger and jealousy” “The problem is that anger and jealousy do not entitle a defendant to
an extreme emotional disturbance charge” (People v. Ross). What was most interesting
about the extreme emotional distress defense is that it is similar to other states that have a
diminished capacity or states that allow mental disease or defect to negate an offense
element. It would appear that EED adds to the issue that was pointed out previously in
regards to New Jersey and states who have abolished the insanity defense and how there
doesn’t seem to be a difference in the outcome even though the statutes are worded
differently depending on the state.
Michigan:
The Michigan statue states:
68.21a Persons deemed legally insane; burden of proof.

Sec. 21a.
(1) It is an affirmative defense to a prosecution for a criminal offense that the
defendant was legally insane when he or she committed the acts constituting the
offense. An individual is legally insane if, as a result of mental illness as defined
in section 400a of the mental health code, Act No. 258 of the Public Acts of 1974,
being section 330.1400a of the Michigan Compiled Laws, or as a result of being
mentally retarded as defined in section 500(h) of the mental health code, Act No.
258 of the Public Acts of 1974, being section 330.1500 of the Michigan Compiled
Laws, that person lacks substantial capacity either to appreciate the nature and
quality or the wrongfulness of his or her conduct or to conform his or her conduct
to the requirements of the law. Mental illness or being mentally retarded does not
otherwise constitute a defense of legal insanity.
(2) An individual who was under the influence of voluntarily consumed or
injected alcohol or controlled substances at the time of his or her alleged offense
is not considered to have been legally insane solely because of being under the
influence of the alcohol or controlled substances.
(3) The defendant has the burden of proving the defense of insanity by a
preponderance of the evidence. (Mich. Comp. Laws § 768.21a).
Even though Michigan uses the ALI rule of law for its insanity defense it, like
several other states has gone to allowing juries to find a defendant “guilty but mentally
ill”. The Legislature created GBMI to limit the number of defendants being found “not
guilty by reason of insanity” and being relieved of all criminal responsibility (People v.
Kukla). In the case of People v. Kukla, the defendant “did not establish, by a

preponderance of the evidence, that she lacked the substantial capacity either to
appreciate the nature and quality or the wrongfulness of…her conduct or to conform...
her conduct to the requirements of the law” (People v. Kukla). Therefore because she
was found to be mentally ill, but didn’t meet all of the requirements to be legally insane
she was found GBMI. For example, a defendant is found GMBI and is sent to a mental
facility to get treatment until they are well enough to serve out the rest of his or her
sentence in prison. Another defendant is found guilty in a state that doesn’t allow insanity
as an affirmative defense, but because of a mental disease or defect brought up during
sentencing also has to go to a mental institution until well enough to serve out the rest of
the sentence in prison. This brings up the question: If states are going to use GBMI, then
what makes them different from states that don’t allow it insanity at all?
Oregon:
Oregon’s statute sounds like any other ALI state statute, except the term for
someone found legally insane is not “not guilty by reason of insanity” but “guilty except
for insanity”. The average person is more likely to be willing to find someone “guilty
except for insanity” as opposed to “not guilty by reason of insanity”. Finding a defendant
guilty helps people to feel that the person is going to get some form of punishment even
if it is through spending time in a mental hospital just the same as someone found NGRI.
Although people found “not guilty by reason of insanity” are not set free, the public often
has that misconception. Another aspect of the Oregon approach that is advocated for is
that when someone is found “guilty except for insanity” is not treated as someone who is
found “guilty but mentally ill” would be. A defendant found GBMI carries a punishment
that includes incarceration as is the case with most criminal convictions, but people found

“guilty except for insanity” fall under the “jurisdiction of the state’s Psychiatric Security
Review Board (PSRB) and generally go to the Oregon State Hospital for treatment and a
later supervised, conditional release” (Shannon 2006).
The Oregon statute is as follows:
O.R.S 161.295 Mental disease or defect
(1) A person is guilty except for insanity if, as a result of mental disease or defect
at the time of engaging in criminal conduct, the person lacks substantial capacity
either to appreciate the criminality of the conduct or to conform the conduct to the
requirements of law.
(2) As used in chapter 743, Oregon Laws 1971, the terms “mental disease or
defect” do not include an abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality constituting
solely a personality disorder. (O.R.S. § 161.295)
Oregon is also unique in the way that it handles treatment. There is a Psychiatric
Security Review Board (PSRB), which reviews people found GEI and determines
whether they are fit for conditional release or if they will have to be committed. The
guidelines for a conditional release are as follows:
161.336. Conditional release by Psychiatric Security Review Board
(1) If the Psychiatric Security Review Board determines that the person presents a
substantial danger to others but can be adequately controlled with supervision and
treatment if conditionally released and that necessary supervision and treatment
are available, the board may order the person conditionally released, subject to
those supervisory orders of the board as are in the best interests of justice, the

protection of society and the welfare of the person. The board may designate any
person or state, county or local agency the board considers capable of supervising
the person upon release, subject to those conditions as the board directs in the
order for conditional release. Prior to the designation, the board shall notify the
person or agency to whom conditional release is contemplated and provide the
person or agency an opportunity to be heard before the board. After receiving an
order entered under this section, the person or agency designated shall assume
supervision of the person pursuant to the direction of the board.
(2) Conditions of release contained in orders entered under this section may be
modified from time to time and conditional releases may be terminated by order
of the board as provided in ORS 161.351. (O.R.S. § 161.336)
The guidelines for commitment are as follows:
161.341. Commitment; discharge or conditional release
(1) If the Psychiatric Security Review Board finds, upon its initial hearing, that
the person presents a substantial danger to others and is not a proper subject for
conditional release, the board shall order the person committed to, or retained in, a
state hospital designated by the Oregon Health Authority if the person is at least
18 years of age, or to a secure intensive community inpatient facility designated
by the authority if the person is under 18 years of age, for custody, care and
treatment. The period of commitment ordered by the board may not exceed the
maximum sentence provided by statute for the crime for which the person was
found guilty except for insanity.

(2) If at any time after the commitment of a person to a state hospital, or to a
secure intensive community inpatient facility, designated by the authority under
this section, the superintendent of the hospital or the director of the secure
intensive community inpatient facility is of the opinion that the person is no
longer affected by mental disease or defect, or, if so affected, no longer presents a
substantial danger to others or that the person continues to be affected by mental
disease or defect and continues to be a danger to others, but that the person can be
controlled with proper care, medication, supervision and treatment if
conditionally released, the superintendent or director shall apply to the board for
an order of discharge or conditional release. The application shall be accompanied
by a report setting forth the facts supporting the opinion of the superintendent or
director. If the application is for conditional release, the application must also be
accompanied by a verified conditional release plan. The board shall hold a
hearing on the application within 60 days of its receipt. Not less than 20 days
prior to the hearing before the board, copies of the report shall be sent to the
Attorney General. (O.R.S. § 161.341).
These guidelines are what help to show how Oregon’s approach is slightly
different from other states. It has specific guidelines for who will be responsible
for the defendant and how the person or peoples left in charge are responsible for
evaluating the defendant to see if he or she is fit to be released either because that
person is no longer suffering from the mental disease or the disease can be
controlled with therapy and medications so the person is no longer a danger to
anyone. The state has also built in a provision that the defendant can not be civilly

committed for longer then what the maximum sentence would have been if they
were sent to prison.
In the case of Beiswenger v. Psychiatric Security Review Board, the
defendant filled for conditional release because he no longer suffers from the
same disorder that he suffered from during the time of his trial. At the time of trial
he suffered from paranoid and chronic residual schizophrenia (Beiswenger v.
Psychiatric Security Review Board). He no longer suffers from those conditions
and now suffers from paraphilia and alcohol and drug dependency. As is stated in
the Oregon statute “abnormality manifested only by repeated criminal or
otherwise antisocial conduct, nor do they include any abnormality constituting
solely a personality disorder” (O.R.S. § 161.295). The case was reversed and
remanded for reconsideration. This case is an example of how Oregon’s unique
way of handling the legally insane and how if a defendant is committed because
he is legally insane, but later is found to not be suffering from insanity can be,
with the proper procedures, reevaluated to get the proper treatment. Oregon’s
approach of having a psychiatric board that evaluates and reevaluates and has
procedures for checking up on people may be what makes it stand out from other
states. While it does follow the same standards as other ALI states, how it deals
with defendants after sentencing is what helps to separate it from other ALI states
and perhaps with further research would show that while the immediate outcome
of insanity cases is not different from other states, the treatment results are.
The two of the three states representing those that use the American Legal
Institute’s Model Penal Code have statutes that can be compared to states that

have abolished the insanity defense. While there is the obvious difference that one
state like Michigan allows insanity to be used as a defense and a state like
Montana, does not, but if states that allow it are moving toward GMBI or EED
and in the end the person is still sent to prison as if they were found guilty in a
state that doesn’t allow insanity as an affirmative defense, but does take into
account mental diseases and defects, then does it necessarily matter what laws are
used to in regards to insane and other mentally ill defendants?

Abolished Insanity Defense

Idaho:
The statute states that:
18-207. Mental condition not a defense--Provision for treatment during
incarceration--Reception of evidence--Notice and appointment of expert
examiners
(1) Mental condition shall not be a defense to any charge of criminal conduct.
(2) If by the provisions of section 19-2523, Idaho Code, the court finds that one
convicted of crime suffers from any mental condition requiring treatment, such
person shall be committed to the board of correction or such city or county
official as provided by law for placement in an appropriate facility for treatment,
having regard for such conditions of security as the case may require. In the event
a sentence of incarceration has been imposed, the defendant shall receive
treatment in a facility, which provides for incarceration or less restrictive

confinement. In the event that a course of treatment thus commenced shall be
concluded prior to the expiration of the sentence imposed, the offender shall
remain liable for the remainder of such sentence, but shall have credit for time
incarcerated for treatment.
(3) Nothing herein is intended to prevent the admission of expert evidence on the
issue of any state of mind which is an element of the offense, subject to the rules
of evidence. (I.C. § 18-207).
As the statute states, a defendant can still present evidence that he or she lacked a
necessary mental element to commit the crime and the prosecution still has to rebut the
defense beyond a reasonable doubt, so in the end the result is somewhat the same, “it is
just that Idaho does not define how to reach that result” (Elkins 1994). In the case State v.
Tiffany, the defendant was charged with involuntary manslaughter for killing a child
while willfully injuring a child while defendant had the care or custody of child. The jury
was not instructed to take into account her mental illness offense did not require intent or
purpose to harm child, offense required understanding of the consequences of the
volitional conduct, and there was no evidence that defendant's mental illness prevented
her from understanding the consequences of her actions. (State v. Tiffany). This case
shows how there could be a possible discrepancy between the rule of law used because if
the insanity defense was allowed then the defendants mental illness might have been
taken into account, but with several states using GMBI, EED, or diminished capacity, it is
possible that the defendant would have also been found guilty in those states. The
possible difference that could have come about from being tried in another state is that
Tiffany could have used her mental illness to receive a lesser degree of punishment.

Montana:
Montana, like so many other states had some form of an insanity test to deal with
criminal responsibility. In 1979 the Montana legislature abolished the affirmative defense
of mental disease or defect. “The legislature's action resulted from increasing frustration
with perceived fraudulent assertions of the insanity defense and the growing role of
psychiatrists in criminal trials” (Stimpson 1994).
The current Montana statute states:
46-14-102. Evidence of mental disease or defect or developmental disability
admissible to prove state of mind
Evidence that the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect or
developmental disability is admissible to prove that the defendant did or did not
have a state of mind that is an element of the offense. (MCA 46-14-102).
46-14-311. Consideration of mental disease or defect or developmental disability
in sentencing
(1) Whenever a defendant is convicted on a verdict of guilty or a plea of guilty or
nolo contendere and claims at the time of the omnibus hearing held pursuant to
46-13-110 or, if no omnibus hearing is held, at the time of any change of plea by
the defendant that at the time of the commission of the offense of which convicted
the defendant was suffering from a mental disease or defect or developmental
disability that rendered the defendant unable to appreciate the criminality of the
defendant's behavior or to conform the defendant's behavior to the requirements
of law, the sentencing court shall consider any relevant evidence presented at the

trial and shall also consider the results of the presentence investigation required
pursuant to subsection (2).
(2) Under the circumstances referred to in subsection (1), the sentencing court
shall order a presentence investigation and a report on the investigation pursuant
to 46-18-111. The investigation must include a mental evaluation by a person
appointed by the director of the department of public health and human services
or the director's designee. The evaluation must include an opinion as to whether
the defendant suffered from a mental disease or defect or developmental disability
with the effect as described in subsection
(1). If the opinion concludes that the defendant did suffer from a mental disease or
defect or developmental disability with the effect as described in subsection (1),
the evaluation must also include a recommendation as to the care, custody, and
treatment needs of the defendant. (MCA 46-14-311).
One of the most prominent cases that stuck out in recent Montana history is State
v. Cowan, where the defendant killed a woman in her cabin after suffering from a
psychotic break because of paranoid schizophrenia. Several psychologists and
psychiatrists agreed that Cowan did suffer from paranoid schizophrenia, but the court
found him guilty of deliberate homicide and aggravated burglary and sentenced him to
sixty years in prison. Cowan argued that “considering a defendant’s insanity only for the
purpose of reducing the degree of the crime or determining the punishment for the crime
qualifies as cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of due process” (Stimpson
1994). The Montana Supreme Court did not find any constructional or due process
violations and the U.S. Supreme Court did not grant his Cowan’s petition for certiorari

(Stimpson 1994). This case goes to the same issue as the case in Idaho, as to whether or
not the defendant would have had a different outcome if the state had allowed insanity as
a defense, but as is often the case where mental illness plays a role in a crime, the
defendant could have been sentenced to civil commitment before serving his or her
sentence in prison. Also if “considering a defendant’s insanity only for the purpose of
reducing the degree of the crime or determining the punishment for the crime qualifies as
cruel and unusual punishment and a violation of due process” (Stimpson 1994), then what
is stop a defendant from saying EED is cruel and unusual punishment because while the
person may not be insane, they are still suffering from a mental illness? Montana does
have a provision that a defendant’s possible mental illness will be evaluated and the
evaluation must also include a recommendation as to the care, custody, and treatment
needs of the defendant, so if the evaluator feels that the defendant should be civilly
committed for treatment then what is the difference from someone found NGRI and
civilly committed?
Kansas:
The Kansas Legislature, in 1995, enacted Kan. Stat. Ann. § 22-3220, which states:
It is a defense to a prosecution under any statute that the defendant, as a result of
mental disease or defect, lacked the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged. Mental disease or defect is not otherwise a defense. The provisions of this
section shall be in force and take effect on and after January 1, 1996.
Kansas follows a sort of mens rea approach. An article on the insanity defense in Kansas
said:

In order for a mentally ill offender to be excused under the mens rea approach,
she must establish mental incapacity, which prevents her from formulating the
mens rea of the crime. The classic example is the defendant who, because of his
mental disease, believed that he was squeezing a lemon when in fact he was
strangling his victim. In such a case, the prosecution has the duty of proving
intent. However, the prosecution would fail under the mens rea approach because
evidence of a mental disease or defect would show that the defendant truly
believed that he was squeezing a lemon and not strangling a human being. Thus,
there is no intent to kill. (Rosen 1999).
In State v. Van Hoet, the defendant was found not guilty by lack of mental state,
and ordered defendant committed to state security hospital, which is determined by
K.S.A. 22-3221:
Same; special jury question
In any case in which the defense has offered substantial evidence of a mental
disease or defect excluding the mental state required as an element of the offense
charged, and the jury returns a verdict of "not guilty," the jury shall also answer a
special question in the following form: "Do you find the defendant not guilty
solely because the defendant, at the time of the alleged crime, was suffering from
a mental disease or defect which rendered the defendant incapable of possessing
the required criminal intent?" The provisions of this section shall be in force and
take effect on and after January 1, 1996.(K.S.A. 22-3221).

When this happens, according the defendant will be evaluated to see if he is a
danger to himself or society and should be committed to a mental institution or if he
should be released or discharged. This is in accordance to K.S.A. 22-3428:
Persons acquitted or verdict of not guilty and jury answers affirmative to special
question; commitment to state security hospital; determination of whether person
is a mentally ill person, notice and hearing; procedure for transfer, release or
discharge, standards, notice and hearing
(1)(a) When a defendant is acquitted and the jury answers in the affirmative to the
special question asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3221 and amendments thereto, the
defendant shall be committed to the state security hospital for safekeeping and
treatment. A finding of not guilty and the jury answering in the affirmative to the
special question asked pursuant to K.S.A. 22-3221 and amendments thereto, shall
be prima facie evidence that the acquitted defendant is presently likely to cause
harm to self or others.
(b) Within 90 days of the defendant's admission, the chief medical officer of the
state security hospital shall send to the court a written evaluation report. Upon
receipt of the report, the court shall set a hearing to determine whether or not the
defendant is currently a mentally ill person. The hearing shall be held within 30
days after the receipt by the court of the chief medical officer's report.
(c) The court shall give notice of the hearing to the chief medical officer of the
state security hospital, the district or county attorney, the defendant and the
defendant's attorney. The court shall inform the defendant that such defendant is
entitled to counsel and that counsel will be appointed to represent the defendant if

the defendant is not financially able to employ an attorney as provided in K.S.A.
22-4503 et seq. and amendments thereto. The defendant shall remain at the state
security hospital pending the hearing.
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall have the right to present evidence and
cross-examine witnesses. At the conclusion of the hearing, if the court finds by
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant is not currently a mentally ill
person, the court shall dismiss the criminal proceeding and discharge the
defendant, otherwise the court may commit the defendant to the state security
hospital for treatment or may place the defendant on conditional release pursuant
to subsection (4). (K.S.A. 22-3428).
Kansas is like Oregon in that its defendants are to be civilly committed and to
have a hearing to see if the person is still mentally ill, and if they are not they can be
dismissed or conditionally released. The main difference is how the person gets to that
stage. In Kansas the defendant is found not guilty with the jury answering in the
affirmative to the special question, which is whether or not mental illness was a factor.
Then the defendant is civilly committed for 90 days for treatment and evaluation, then
there is hearing and the defendant can be found to be suffering from a mental illness or
that he or she is no longer suffering from a mental illness and can be released or
conditionally released. Kansas has help to show that even if a state abolishes the insanity
defense, it does not mean that mentally ill patients will be receive sentences that are cruel
and unusual. Most importantly Kansas helps to show even if states statutes are different
and how a defendant gets from A to B doesn’t matter if the outcome is still the same.

The three states that have abolished the insanity defense illustrate what has been
fairly well supported all along, and that is that it doesn’t matter what rule of law a state
uses or how a statute is worded, because in the end it doesn’t matter how many different
ways there are to get the outcome if the outcome is still the same.
Analysis
The insanity defense has been around in some form or another for thousands of
years, but the focus of this essay is whether or not the current tests for the insanity
defense have an impact on the outcome, or if the rule of law used or lack thereof has no
affect at all. As the brief overview pointed out, there are a few key differences between
the M’Naghten and American Legal Institute Model Penal Code, such as the volitional
prong. The volitional prong is key difference because several critics of the M’Naghten
rule of law feel it is something that it is lacking, but is necessary. It would appear from
the cases evaluated from states that use both M’Naghten and ALI, that there is not a
significant difference between the cases. When comparing the cases from the six states
that use a test, it is evident that a defendant can be found NGRI, but it is few and far
between and for the most part a defendant will either be found “guilty but mentally ill” or
charged with a lesser degree of the original charge because the mental defect negates an
offense element. As for the states with no insanity laws the argument could be made that
perhaps not allowing insanity an affirmative defense has an impact on the defendant
because if the defendant is found “not guilty by reason of insanity” or found “guilty but
mentally ill”, there is more a chance of him or her getting the treatment he or she needs
instead of being sent to a prison before receiving treatment at a mental hospital first.

There is no way of knowing until further research is done that goes through several states
from each state
After briefly reviewing the state of Oregon and how they deal with the issue of
legal insanity, I would recommend Oregon as a good starting place for improving the
insanity defense and that getting rid of the insanity defense is not the right direction to go.
Where it was evident people like Yates should be held accountable for the action they
took, sending them to a regular prison will probably not help them. Psychiatric treatment
in prisons is widely criticized and is one of the main reasons the American Bar
Association and the American Psychiatric Association are opposed to the “guilty but
mentally ill verdict”(Shannon 2006). As was quoted by Dr. Howard Zonona a psychiatrist
from Yale who has been the head of the American Academy of Psychiatry and the Law in
an article by “GMBI is a farce in that it is no different from a guilty verdict” (Shannon
2006).
It doesn’t offer any specific treatment. It doesn’t offer anything any different from
going to jail and getting whatever any other prisoner would get” (Shannon 2006). Oregon
at least from the cases and statues that were analyzed seems to have procedures that
really try to get at working with the defendant in a mental facility and to work with that
person until they are ready to be conditionally released and if not they are ready to keep
them is such a facility so they are not a harm to themselves and to others. One aspect that
stuck out was the willingness through formal procedures to keep record of the defendants
and to check up on them. Also the willingness to have the board reevaluate the person to
see if they should be committed if they were originally conditionally released or to
conditionally release them if they were committed after trial. The second part is

significant because it is often brought because some many NGRI defendants are civilly
committed for a longer period of time then if they had been sent to prison.
One interesting finding was that two of the most influential states (California and
Texas) when it comes to setting legislative precedent, switched from sing M’Naghten to
ALI for a short period of time, and then back to M’Naghten. It would be interesting to see
what caused this change and how the legislature and courts of those two states felt the
need to switch back to M’Naghten when they felt the need to change the ALI test because
of flaws in the M’Naghten test? While this is a separate topic for another essay, it might
be worth taking a look at.
The recommendations for this issue are that the states should follow one rule of
law, with variations allowed to fit the local needs, but as with so many other issues such
as the death penalty, it is left up to each to state as to how it should be handled. While the
recommendation is that each state should follow the same rule of law or basic set of
guidelines as to how to handle insanity, it would appear that differing rules of law do not
make a difference in the outcome, so for right now it would appear that the states are fine,
but perhaps with further research to investigate and find the best rule of law to use a
change will be made.
Conclusion
The insanity defense is a topic that has brought about much outrage and
disapproval from the public. This public outcry would appear to be the product of highly
publicized insanity cases and the public not understanding what actually happens when
someone is found “not guilty by reason of insanity”. The affect the public has had on the
rule of law used in insanity cases can be seen as a result of the Hinckley trial. It caused

some states such as Idaho to abolish the defense altogether. Dissatisfaction with a certain
rule has also caused states such as California and Texas to go from M’Naghten to ALI
back to M’Naghten. The question is whether or not all of these changes in the standards
used to test if someone is insane or by not allowing insanity as an affirmative defense
altogether has any impact on inanity cases? The answer seems to be that the rule of law
used does not appear to have an affect on the outcome of inanity cases. There has been
come contention as to whether or not some cases is states who have abolished the
insanity defense would have ended up differently if the person was tried in state allowing
the insanity defense, but there is no guarantee that the outcome would have been any
different. Oregon did seem to have some possible ways to help change how the public
views the inanity and to help them with the notion that the person is getting away without
being punished. Oregon has accomplished this by changing the verdict from “not guilty
by reason of insanity” to “guilty but inane” making the public feel that the person is
getting punished even though the actually punishment is that same as someone found
NGRI.
The weaknesses of this research are the limited number of states and cases
analyzed. The conclusion could be more definitive if more states were researched or if
districts court cases could be analyzed for a few states representing M’Naghten,
American Legal Institute and those who have abolished insanity as an affirmative
defense. As was pointed out in Psychology and the Legal System, “Few individual states
keep complete records on the use of the insanity defense and its relative success”
(Wrightsman and al. 2002) and because this is the case, it would take several years to
look at all of the states and several cases to see if all this debate on what test of insanity

works and if it make a difference at all. The strengths of the research are perhaps now
that the idea is out there more research will be done on the laws used to define insanity
and the insanity defense in general and perhaps with further research one rule of law will
surface as being superior to others and the federal government will move to standardize
that rule of law for all states as it started to do with the Insanity Defense Reform Act of
1984. Perhaps though it is not the test that should analyzed, but the sentencing and
treatment that the defendant receives. As is often the biggest issue stated for the verdict of
“guilty but mentally ill”, the problem is that the defendants while they might not be
legally insane often still have a mental illness and they do not receive the proper
treatment while on the prison system. Further research should be looking at the treatment
that defendants receive in each state and maybe changing the law so that defendants
found guilty, but who have a mental illness should be civilly committed and after several
evaluations if they are found to not be suffering from mental illness can then serve out the
rest of their sentence in prison.
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